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Past & current safety studies II 
















CC  =Chemical control
CPS=Coolant purification system
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Past & current safety studies III
Methodology
transition from conceptual level to integral approach
Consequences in view of DEMO-FPP development
specification of design & licensing requirements  general plant safety approach
safety requirements  safety functions  safety concept
safety importance classification  design options to match requirements
 general safety principles document
integrated safety analysis  plant safety demonstration
operational mode (duration, availability, ISI&R*, design limits) 
quantification of source terms (fuel, activ. materials, effluents, plant logistics) 
identification of energy potentials (magn., chemical, plasma, thermal)
internal events and external events and hazards
 development of validated tools, uncertainties, QA measures
 analysis in view of worst case with respect to plant and environment
 preliminary safety document
Radioactive waste management  public acceptance
waste (liq., sol., gas) logistics (RH, casks), separation (hot cell), immobilization
clearance, dose rates (nuclide spec.) 
quantity reduction
 safety and disposal concept *ISI&R=In-Service Inspection and Repair
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Power plant concepts
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)
nested physically static barriers
high volumetric power density
off-site fuel conditioning
criticality prevention measures
1% of Pth decay power
very high radioactive inventory
Fusion Power Plant (FPP)
2 static but also dynamic barriers
low volumetric power density
on-site fuel management
criticality arguments absent
0.6% of Pth decay power
high radioactive inventory (many
mobile, different nuclide vectors)
PCS=pow. conv. System
SA  =severe accident
DHR=Decay heat removal
modified from  K. Oh et al., Fusion Eng. Des. 88 (2013) 648
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Nuclear power plant safety approach I
Safety requirements*
 Protection of public and environment against radiological hazards 
 Protection of site workers against radiation exposure according to ALARA-principle 
(As Low As Reasonably Achievable)
 Employment of measures to prevent accidents and mitigate their consequences
 Elimination of need for public evacuation in any accident
 Minimization of activated waste
Safety functions*
 Primary safety functions
 Confinement of radioactive materials
 Control of operational releases
 Limitation of accidental releases
 Secondary safety functions
 Ensure emergency power shutdown
 Provisions for decay heat removal (potentially passive)
 Control of thermal energy (coolant(-s) enthalpy)
 Control chemical energies
 Control of other potentially likely energy discharges or interactions
 Limitation of airborne& liquid operating releases to environment
*PPCS GDRD 2004
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 4/5 static subsequent enveloped barriers
 Static barriers for release control (mainly 
related to barriers + PAR+ PRS)
 „practical elimination“ of level 5 by design +
core catcher + mitigation chains
 Compact system, small control volume, 
high power density, rare release paths
NPP- PWR 
 Two static barriers extended over large scale
 Mixture of static and dynamic barriers (DTS, 
TES, HVACS)
 Large sets of active + passive systems (but 
lower inventory and energy content )
 Large volume, low power density, several 




 Control of releases
 Limitation of releases
Safety functions
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 Design measures (CR, n-poison)
 DHR systems
 not required (limited on-site storage of SA)
 Multi-stage systems for severe accidents
Secondary safety functions
 terminate nuclear reactions
 ensure decay heat removal
 controlled chemical, magnetic, and thermal discharge
 limit release to environment
PWR 
 FPSS (intrinsic feature-but early detection)
 Passive design provisions
 Physically different sub-systems required 
 Mobile species to identify
FPP
FPSS
 Cryostat confinement ?
 Double-walled containment ?
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Defence in Depth Safety Concept (DiD) *
Definition of plant state levels in DiD  solid data base in ITER / PPCS





operation Prevention of abnormal operation and failures
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*INSAG 2010, WENRA 2
Nuclear power plant safety approach II
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Definition of plant state levels in DiD
*INSAG 2010, WENRA 2
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Nuclear power plant safety approach IV
Safety risk approach
 Discrimination 
Design Basis Accidents (DBA)
* Design Basis Extension in ITER ~ BDBA Gulden,2012

















mean nat. dose 1mSv/a
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Nuclear power plant safety approach V
Safety risk approach
 Mitigation into the acceptable risk zone by countermeasures 
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Nuclear power plant safety approach VI
There are many kinds of safety!!!! 









(mainly governed by radio protection)
accidental analysis
inevitable consequences
(radio protection, societal contract)
 all to be matched for a nuclear plant license
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Comparison of safety concept fusion  fission  I
General:  
Physics/technology basis of FPP differs from NPP 
 fusion specific adaptions has to be implemented in licensing procedures.
Most percepted argument = public safety in terms of radiological hazard
Enveloping event by maximum radiologic release 
 Identification of in-plant energy sources causing/accelerating an event 
 Quantification of sources of radioactive inventory (=source term(s))
 Assessment of 
 release fractions (by energy inventories +mechanistic arguments-deterministic), 
 release time (deterministic) and 
 ambient conditions (weather –probabilistic)
Result
 Analysis of dose rates in three domains 
 (vital area – in plant), 
 protected area (1km at fence border) and 
 to public (>1km) for most exposed individual (MEI*)
* MEI=Most Exposed Individual .
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Comparison of safety concept fusion  fission II
Main energy inventories in a FPP for enveloping event 
But be careful 
potential chemical interactions are not considered  
considerations limited to blanket, contributions may require incorporation of 
divertor, heating systems other PFC with different nuclide vector
ACP content due to unknown coolant chemistry problematic 
lack of validated tools to predict temporal evolution (conservative assessments by 
now)
* ACP=activated corrosion products.
Energy Source Energy Reference
in-vessel fuel (DT)-(self-limiting 
in case off accident)
~ 325 GJ SEAFP, SEIF
magnetic field ~ 200 GJ SEAFP, SEIF
plasma thermal energy 1 to 2 GJ SEAFP, SEIF, PPCS
primary coolant water enthalpy ~ 400 GJ SEAFP, SEIF
16 Fusion Safety in View of Fission regulations | Stieglitz, Wolf, Taylor et al. 3rd IAEA DEMO Prog. Workshop, Hefei, China, May 2015
Comparison of safety concept  fusion  fission III
Worst dose rates estimates (for the same power) 
 Different source terms
 Fusion: tritium, dust, activation products, Activated Corrosion products (ACPs), neutron 
sputtering products. Tritium inventory in the Vacuum Vessel (VV) ~1kg.
 Fission nuclides of PWR: Iodine, Cs-137, noble gases, aerosols, ... 
 NPP: effective dose of DBA ≤ 50mSv. BDBA e.g. 100mSv  evacuation
 Fusion: bounding accident   ≤ 50mSv  no evacuation
accidental releases  FPP by in-plant energies  several orders of magnitude lower 
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Comparison of safety concept  fusion  fission IV
Is assumption of maximum releases justified ? 
 Assume 1kg T- to be released
 worst case dose to public 0.4Sv (1km distance from release point) 
 Safety concept mandatory 
Is specification of allowable radionuclide inventory a reasonable approach? 
 From plant safety aspect and operational aspects - yes !
Advantages
 specification of nuclides to be used in structure 
 coolant chemistry/purification required to assure operation
 man/machine operation 
 …….
Example
 Evolution of collective dose in NPP`s
by adapted coolant conditioning and 
material choices
Learnt
 Dedicated procedures/material 




* WANO, 2013, Performance indicators of NPP
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Comparison of safety concept  fusion  fission  VI
Reactivity control, fuel and inventory
 NPP: largest part of the inventory stored inside the fuel rods 
 requirements for the fuel,
 handling and for the control of reactivity and 
 prevention of re-criticality.
 Fusion: Excursions of the reaction rate can be excluded due to inherent features of the 
design
x not applied to FPP: control of reactivity
 applied to FPP: plasma shutdown of the facility under any circumstances 
Barriers
 NPP: multiple barriers on several consecutive levels of defense for confinement of the 
radioactive materials
 Fusion: inventories of source terms are not concentrated locally. Active retention functions 
like detritiation systems are used.
 applied to FPP: physical barriers and retention systems
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Comparison of safety concept  fusion  fission  VII
Defense in depth and independence of levels of defense 
 NPPs: several safety functions are ensured by multiple installations related 
to different levels of defense
 Fusion: safety concept is also based on the concept of levels of defense.
 assign the safety functions of a FPP to certain level(s) of defense, if plant design will be 
available
 applied to FPP: defense in depth, but the independence of the different measures and 
installations for all safety functions is currently not possible
External events and very rare man-made external hazards 
 A complete fission reactor safety analysis shall incorporate an analysis of the impact of 
external events on the plant.
 In ITER for the first time, and they will be covered in the safety concept of on-going 
DEMO, as well as for future FPPs.
First of its kind
 NPP: use of proven technologies and qualified materials as well as validated calculation 
methods for the safety demonstration based on operational experience
 FPP: only minor operational experience is available for a power plant.
x not applied to FPP: requirements with respect to the evaluation of the operation experience
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Comparison of safety concept  fusion  fission  VIII
Cooling 
 NPPs: decay heat from fuel elements has to be removed to avoid eventual 
fuel element damage and the break of barriers
 Fusion: decay heat of in-vessel components at EOC (blanket, divertor, etc.)
 applied to FPP: requirements regarding cooling 
Leak before break 
 NPP: certain parts of the piping the component integrity is guaranteed by applying the 
“leak-before-break concept” (LBB) in the plant design.
 Fusion: LBB concept cannot be assessed currently.
 applied to FPP: LBB concept
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Comparison of safety concept  fusion  fission  IX
Postulated initiating events (internal events)
 Similar as in nuclear power plants such as 
 Loss of flow accident (LOFA),Loss of offsite-power (SBO), Leaks (VV, Primary System, 
…), Fire & explosion 
 Additional fusion specific events: loss of cryo-system, arcing, magnets affecting barriers 
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Comparison of safety concept  fusion  fission  X
Most crucial radiological event =Loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
Goal 




Any safety demonstration design and system (including sec. side) dependent !
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DEMO in view of severe accidents  I 
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)
Event severity  ten times greater for each increase in level of the scale*1
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DEMO in view of severe accidents  II 
How much radionuclide inventory is acceptable to exclude for an 
enveloping event exceeding INES-6?
comparison of DEMO 5kg T with 1.2GW PWR
Specific potential dose for a MEI, assuming highest release categories, most 
unfavourable weather conditions and no-counter measures *1
 Substantially lower dose rate in  FPP
comparison of a DEMO (5kg T) with Chernobyl
 Exclusion of INES 6 allows Tritium-release of 9kg !!!
*1 Gulden ,1993, *2 Gulden, 1994
FUSION FISSION  (1200MW-generic PWR)
Isotope Tritium 131I 137Cs 90Sr 239Pu 88Kr 133,135Xe
rad. nuclide inventory [TBq] 1.85E6 3.8E6 2.6E5 1.3E5 1.1E3 2.8E6 8.9E6
specific potential dose rate 1 HTO 
0.1 HT
6900 1850 1150 500 3 0.2
FUSION FISSION (Chernobyl- C-Moderated Reactor)
Isotope Trit./HTO 131I 137Cs 90Sr 239Pu 88Kr 133,135Xe
radio nuc. inventory [TBq] 1.85E6 1.3E6 2.9E5 2.0E5 850 3.3E6 1.7E6
spec. potential dose rate 1 2360 2070 1770 390 3 0.05
acc. release fraction [%] 20 13 4 5 100 100
spec. potential dose rate 
by released isotope
1 470 270 70 12 3 0.05
25 Fusion Safety in View of Fission regulations | Stieglitz, Wolf, Taylor et al. 3rd IAEA DEMO Prog. Workshop, Hefei, China, May 2015
DEMO in view of severe accidents  III
Safety against external hazards- (“Fukushima challenge”)
 Earthquake
 Flooding 
 Air plane crash
 Terrorist attack 
 More stringent rules for robustness demonstration against external hazards for 
NPP  (FPP)  are expected 
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Secondary heat removal 
system (partially, LOHS ?) 
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Unknowns to be identified / assessed  II
Energy inventories wrt.
 release time 
 detection of failures 
Nuclide inventories
 release paths / fractions
 Tritium saturation in structures
 Diffusion / monitoring in 
structures
 Max. allowed release fractions 
(Be / SiC = ? )
Operationalisation of safety 
by design 
 PHTSs (Blanket, Divertor, NBI)
 Material criteria
 Monitoring control (time scale, 
redundancy, diversity)
 Release path @ anticipated 
failure
Dust inventory and removal
Plasma instabilities 
 time scales
 early detection systems / diversity 
 prevention measures - shut-down proc.
Magnets 
 Evolution of magnet faults (structure, 
arcing, quench detection, …) 
 Station black out requirements 
“Nuclear Fuel” 
 inventory (free, stored in structures) e.g. 
temperature dependence
 interaction with structures / residuals
 on-line accountancy
 potential for in-pile failure
Coolant enthalpy
 interaction with in-vessel components
 coolant activation (ACP) & control 
(e.g. erosion products)
 activity & integrity monitoring
 potential for in-pile failure
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Unknowns to be identified / assessed  III
Operational probation of
 safety relevant control systems, components or detectors in 
nuclear environment (accuracy, failure resistance, …)
 Intrinsic / defined barriers (failure mode, aggravating effects in case of failure, …)
Material behavior at high irradiation doses  IFMIF 
 Material data base (design rules, failure resistance, operational measure/threads)
 Design margins for design / safety margins to be set
 Potential interactions with coolants (corrosion/erosion, SCC, IASCC, fretting, 




 TES (Tritium Extraction System) – efficiency, failure scenarios, time scales –
doubling time
 CPS (Coolant Purification Systems) – efficiency, malfunction monitoring, …
 Tritium mitigation techniques
 all around the tritium plant …
Waste management
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Unknowns to be identified / assessed  IV
Waste management starts from the extraction (RH) to the hot cell 
integrated along the entire path and duration
Example: ITER Transfer cask radiation doses*
Transfer Cask Radiation Doses
*1FW module (BLK#15) . irradiated in ITER (B-lite), 21 days decay, R2Smesh, U. Fischer et al. 2013
single FW modules in Transfer Cask
Shut-down dose rate map [Sv/h] for 
activated FW module in transfer cask







biological dose rate on cask surface 
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EUROfusion
WPSAE-WP2
Summary & Recommendations 
Fusion safety concepts relies on state-of-the-art safety concepts for 
nuclear installations containing radioactive environment and is based on 
DiD concept.
Similarities and differences between safety concepts of fusion and fission. 
Main reasons for differences are radioactive inventories in plants and 
relevant potential release paths
Plant-internal events do not result in conditions requiring off-site evacuation
Systematic assignment of measures & installations to the different levels of 
defence (as required by internat. fission regulations) has to be performed 
once an adequately detailed design level of a FPP is attained.
Safety function “cooling” demands detailed design of in-vessel components 
(blanket&others) and necessitates demonstration of safe decay (passive ) 
heat removal development of validated tools mandatory
External hazards must be included in the future safety analysis
Numerous issues remain open and requires adequate attention
Waste management has not been considered EUROfusion
WPSAE-WP2
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